New housing supply and the dilution of social capital by Hilber, Christian A. L.
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 123 
 
 
 
NEW HOUSING SUPPLY  
AND THE  
DILUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
 
by 
Christian A. L. Hilber∗ 
 
Department of Geography and Environment 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
August 2007 
ISBN: 978-0-85328-114-6
                                                 
∗
 The author wishes to thank Paul Cheshire, Gilles Duranton, Steve Gibbons, Edward Norton, Jos Van 
Ommeren, Ioulia Ossokina, Henry Overman, Antonio Páez, Robert Putnam, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Raven 
Saks, Olmo Silva, Tom Sander, Maarten van’t Riet and seminar/conference participants at the London School of 
Economics, the 51st  and 52nd Annual North American Meetings of the Regional Science Association 
International, and the CPB in Den Haag for helpful comments and suggestions. Peter Wright provided excellent 
research assistance. A research grant from the London School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. The 
remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. Address correspondence to: Christian Hilber, London 
School of Economics, Department of Geography and Environment, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, 
United Kingdom. Phone: +44-20-7107-5016. Fax: +44-20-7955-7412. E-mail: c.hilber@lse.ac.uk. 
  
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 123 
 
 
NEW HOUSING SUPPLY  
AND THE  
DILUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of local housing market conditions for social capital 
accumulation and neighborhood club good provision. A model of individual investment 
decisions predicts that in a setting with high property transaction costs (i) homeowners are 
more likely to invest in social capital than renters and (ii) the positive link between 
homeownership and social capital is stronger in more built-up neighborhoods with inelastic 
supply of new housing. In these neighborhoods homeowners are largely protected from 
inflows of newcomers that would dilute the net benefit from social capital in the longer run. 
Empirical evidence from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey confirms the 
model predictions. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that the effects are causal. 
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1  Introduction and Background 
The monitoring of one’s property by friendly neighbors or watch groups, a neighbor 
holding one’s spare key, BBQ-parties among closely connected neighbors, or a pool of 
trusting parents that look after each other’s children are all examples of club goods that are 
essentially the result of accumulated social capital among a group of contributing neighbors. 
In this context, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) have argued that homeowners are ‘better 
citizens’ because homeownership (i) creates barriers to mobility and (ii) gives individuals an 
incentive to invest in local amenities and social capital since community quality is capitalized 
into property values.  
Simple stylized facts from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (2000), 
suggest, however, that homeowners may not always be ‘better citizens’. For example, while 
homeowners, compared to renters, on average socially interact 30 percent more often with 
immediate neighbors in essentially built-up neighborhoods (more than 85 percent developed), 
the difference between the two groups is only about 9 percent in an ‘average’ neighborhood 
(45 to 55 percent developed) and there is virtually no difference between the two groups in 
little developed neighborhoods (less than 15 percent developed). These numbers change little 
when other factors – including population density in the developed area – are controlled for.  
How can this be explained? In this paper I argue that property transaction costs 
(interpreted broadly) create incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital because it 
discourages free riding. Homeowners can in principle free ride on other neighbors’ social 
capital investments by selling their property and pocketing the proceeds from the improved 
neighborhood quality. However, such free riding is not an attractive option if transaction costs 
exceed the benefits derived from the improved neighborhood quality. In a world with high 
transaction costs the question then becomes whether the homeowner’s long-term benefits 
derived from social capital exceed the costs and I will argue that the answer to this question 
crucially depends on the elasticity of new local housing supply – proxied by the share of 
developable land in the neighborhood. 
Consider a neighborhood where renters are free to move but where property transaction 
costs make existing homeowners immobile. In such a setting homeowners have greater 
incentives to invest in social capital compared to renters as long as the long-term net benefit 
exceeds the initial investment cost. This is because homeowners can internalize the long-term 
net benefits from their investments. In contrast, renters are deprived of those net benefits since 
landlords can pocket proceeds by increasing rents. The elasticity of new housing supply is 
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critical for the likelihood of social capital investment because it affects the inflow of 
newcomers and thereby determines the homeowners’ long-term net benefit from social 
capital. In a built-up neighborhood with perfectly inelastic supply of developable land for new 
housing, initial investors into social capital are largely protected from inflows of newcomers 
that would dilute the net benefit from that social capital in the longer run.1 In contrast, in a 
little developed neighborhood with elastic supply (i.e., low opportunity cost of conversion and 
lax land use regulations), newly accumulated social capital will steer landowners to develop 
new housing units as long as the price exceeds the marginal (opportunity) cost of conversion. 
In the long-run, the net benefit from social capital is diluted to an extent that the marginal 
newcomer’s net benefit and the corresponding house price premium become very small. It is 
quite intuitive that in such a setting nobody has an incentive to make a sizeable investment in 
the neighborhood’s social capital in the first place. Hence, homeowners may only be ‘better 
citizens’ in more built-up neighborhoods with inelastic long-term supply of new housing. 
The outlined argument is not only relevant for investment in social capital. For example, 
an investment in a local public school may increase school quality in the short-run. However, 
if supply of new housing is elastic, inflow of households with children will dilute the benefits 
in the longer-run (because the additional resources have to be shared among more pupils) and 
thereby reduce the homeowner’s incentive to vote for the investment in the first place. Hilber 
and Mayer (2004) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this view.  
In an even broader context, the outlined argument is important for a wide range of studies 
that conclude that homeowners are ‘better citizens’ or are ‘more motivated to control local 
government because its services and taxes affect the value of their homes’ (e.g., DiPasquale 
and Glaeser, 1999; Fischel, 2001), that house value maximizing voters can ensure an efficient 
provision of local public services (see e.g. Edelson, 1976; Sonstelie and Portney, 1978; 
Wildasin, 1979; Sprunger and Wilson, 1998), or that house price capitalization provides an 
incentive mechanism in an inter-temporal sense, that is, an incentive to provide an optimal 
level of durable or intergenerational public goods (see e.g. Brueckner and Joo, 1991; Glaeser, 
1996; Oates and Schwab, 1996 and 1998; Conley and Rangel, 2001; Rangel, 2005).  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper provides strong support for the view that 
in a world with high transaction costs the elasticity of new housing supply – as proxied by the 
                                                 
1
 In the theoretical model proposed in this paper the dilution of net benefits occurs because the entry of a 
marginal newcomer increases an initial contributor’s social capital maintenance cost more than it increases the 
gross benefits derived from the social capital stock. The ‘dilution effect’ may also arise from congestion. That is, 
an additional newcomer may reduce rather than increase the benefits, which existing contributors derive from 
social capital. The theoretical propositions formulated in this paper are independent of whether the dilution effect 
arises from increased maintenance cost or congestion. 
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share of developable land in the neighborhood – is an important determinant of a household’s 
social capital investment decision. This is true even when controlling for the population 
density within the developed area of the neighborhood and many other characteristics that are 
expected to affect social capital accumulation and even when using instrumental variable (IV) 
estimates that treat the share developed land, the population density and the respondent’s 
homeownership status as endogenous.2 The empirical analysis also tests and confirms other 
elements of the theory and discounts alternative explanations of the empirical findings.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic characteristics of 
neighborhood specific social capital, presents a two-stage model of individual investment 
decisions and discusses alternative theoretical frameworks and their predictions. Section 3 
describes the data sources, discusses empirical specifications and identification strategies and 
presents evidence in support of the model predictions. Section 4 derives conclusions. 
 
2  Theoretical Framework and Predictions 
 
2.1 Economic Characteristics of Neighborhood Specific Social Capital 
Neighborhood specific social capital is defined in this paper as a connection among 
neighbors, which enables them to cooperate and which subsequently facilitates the provision 
of  a number of mutually beneficial club goods.3 Neighborhood specific social capital can be 
accumulated, for example, by socially interacting with neighbors or by participating in 
neighborhood clubs. These activities enable individuals to (a) develop a common language 
with one another so that communication is easier and (b) establish relationships, for example, 
in the form of organized or spontaneous shared social activities, so that neighbors will trust 
and like each other more. While shared social activities (e.g., BBQ-parties among neighbors) 
themselves can be interpreted as utility generating club goods, other club goods are the result 
of social capital induced trust and friendship. For example, trust and sympathy among 
neighbors enables them to provide club goods that are simply the product of shared private or 
                                                 
2
 The empirical work below decomposes the population density in a neighborhood into two multiplicative 
components: the population density in the developed area and the share of developed land in the neigbhorhood. 
This approach enables separate estimation of the effect of land scarcity (potential supply of new housing) and the 
physical proximity of neighbors (as an inverse measure for the cost of social interactions). See Brueckner and 
Largey (2006) for an analysis of the effect of population density – measured as population divided by total area – 
on individual measures of social capital investment. Largely consistent with the findings in this paper, their 
empirical results show a negative rather than a positive effect of density on the number of social interactions. 
3 Definitions of the term social capital differ across studies and across the social sciences. The origins of the 
term ‘social capital’ are discussed, for example, in Manski (2000) or Durlauf (2002). For a discussion of the 
determinants of social capital and the role of social capital for economic outcomes and the well-being of people 
see, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam et al. (1993) or Putnam (1995). See Glaeser, Laibson and 
Sacerdote (2002) for a description of the ‘economic approach’ to social capital. Manski (2000) or Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004) provide survey articles on the economic analysis of social interactions. 
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common property (e.g., shared or communal gardens). Finally, trust and sympathy can 
encourage the provision of benefits in the form of mutually beneficial reciprocal behavior 
(e.g., monitoring of one’s absent property by friendly neighbors, holding a neighbor’s spare 
key, or informal child care arrangements). 
Neighborhood specific social capital has some particular economic characteristics. To 
begin with, it is in practice partially but not fully excludable. Investors in neighborhood 
specific social capital (‘club members’) can typically exclude free riders from access to the 
benefits derived from social capital, for example, by not inviting them to join a club event or 
by turning a blind eye on an absent free rider’s property. However, exclusion is in practice 
incomplete in that it is often unfeasible, not considered fair or in some cases not rational to 
exclude newcomers to a neighborhood who are willing to cooperate. One consequence of this 
partial non-excludability is that net benefits derived from neighborhood specific social capital, 
after an initial investment period, make the location not only more attractive to existing 
residents but also to potential newcomers, increasing the demand for properties in the 
neighborhood, and – assuming that housing supply is not perfectly elastic – also increasing 
house values.4 This implies that property owners can free ride on other residents’ investments 
by selling their property as long as the potential gains exceed property transaction costs. 
Another defining characteristic of neighborhood specific social capital is that it typically 
involves an initial investment/production phase and a subsequent maintenance/consumption 
phase. Consider the investment phase first. A quite sizeable ‘social capital investment’ is 
usually needed to initiate the process of generating trust and friendship among the involved 
neighbors M . The individual investment costs of contributing neighbors can be expressed as  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]+f vinv inv invc M c M c M= .  (1) 
 
The term finvc  denotes each initiating member’s share of the total fixed cost burden finvC  
associated with the set up of initiating meetings and club structures, whereas f finv invc C M=  
(i.e., the fixed cost is shared equally among all members). The term vinvc  denotes the individual 
variable cost related to the time spent to establish relationships with all involved initiating 
club members. It can be assumed that this cost component increases linearly with M  (i.e., 
there are no economies of scales in establishing trust). First and second derivatives yield: 
                                                 
4
 If neighborhood specific social capital were fully excludable and initiators chose to exclude newcomers, 
then nobody would have a social capital induced incentive to enter the neighborhood and the social capital 
induced house price premium would be zero. However, if intiators could not exclude free riders at all, not even 
initial ones, then everybody would try to free ride and the social capital would not be provided in the first place. 
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 (1.1) 
The last two derivatives imply that the individual social capital investment cost first 
decreases and then increases with the number of initiating investors (inverse U-shaped curve).  
Now consider the maintenance phase. Once trust and friendship among initiating 
investors is established, a ‘maintenance effort’ of ‘contributors’ (initial investors and 
cooperative newcomers) is usually sufficient to ensure the provision of social capital induced 
club benefits in the longer run. The individual maintenance costs are determined by (a) the 
number of initial club members M  (the larger the club size the more relationships need to be 
maintained among initiating members) and (b) the number of cooperative newcomers M∆  
(new relationships need to be established). In this context it is reasonable to assume that the 
cost of maintaining an existing relationship existλ is significantly lower than the cost of 
establishing a new relationship newλ . Newcomers have to establish relationships with all club 
members, while initiating club members only have to establish relationships with the 
newcomers. The cost functions for initial investors and newcomers can be expressed as: 
[ ], exist newinvm M M M Mλ λ∆ = × + ∆ ×   (2.1) 
[ ] [ ] newnewm M M M M λ+ ∆ = + ∆ × .5 (2.2) 
If  we define ( )0new existλ λ λ− = ∆ > and reformulate equations (2.1) and (2.2) we get: 
[ ] [ ] [ ],new inv new invm M m M M m M M M λ−∆ = + ∆ − ∆ = × ∆ , (2.3) 
whereas [ ] [ ]0 .new inv invm M c M−< ∆ < 6 
Equation (2.3) implies that newcomers, compared to initial investors, have higher costs in 
the maintenance phase and that the cost difference depends on the number of initiators in 
period 1. Overall, however, newcomers have a comparative cost advantage over initiators for 
                                                 
5
 Alternatively, one could assume that the marginal cost of establishing a new relationship increases because 
the involved neighbors have time constraints and because a large number of newcomers threatens the developed 
common language. This alternative assumption does not fundamentally alter the model predictions. 
6
 This follows from the fact that it is not plausible to assume that the cost of establishing a contact in the 
initiating phase exceeds the cost newλ  of establishing a new contact in the maintenance phase. If the per-contact-
cost are assumed to be identical (= newλ ) then [ ] finv invc M C M M λ= + × . Consequently, [ ]invc M - [ ]new invm M−∆  
= ( ) 0finvC M M λ λ+ × − ∆ > , since 0existλ λ λ− ∆ = >  and 0finvC > . Note that newcomers have to establish one 
contact less compared to initial investors. However, the latter had to establish one contact less among themselves 
in stage 1 compared to the newcomers in stage 2. The two effects cancel each other out. 
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two reasons: Firstly, newcomers avoid the fixed costs associated with the initiation process. 
Secondly, newcomers only have to establish contacts with initiators in the maintenance phase, 
while initiators have to establish and maintain those contacts.  
Finally, the social capital induced gross benefits B  can be assumed to increase at a 
decreasing rate with the number of club members M M+ ∆  in the maintenance phase, that is, 
( ) 0B M M∂ ∂ + ∆ >  and ( )22 0B M M∂ ∂ + ∆ < . Take the example of childcare arrangements 
among trusting parents. Adding another mutually beneficial link to a small pool of parents 
substantially increases the likelihood of being able to make an arrangement when needed. 
Adding another link to a very large pool increases each member’s benefit only marginally. 
 
2.2 A Model of Social Capital Investment Decisions 
This section presents a model with individual social capital investment decisions that 
explicates the provision of social capital induced benefits as the outcome of a dynamic game 
with complete and perfect information and with a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategy.7 
The model, which builds on the considerations in Section 2.1 and uses its notations, is 
parsimonious in that it only consists of one neighborhood with some open developable land – 
plus the outside world – and two time periods { }1, 2t ∈ ; an investment or production phase 
(stage 1) and a subsequent maintenance and consumption phase (stage 2). The game is solved 
backwards. The investment decisions are modeled as discrete functions. 
 
Basic Structure and Assumptions 
I start with a brief overview of the game, describing the timing, the set of players and 
their set of actions. Then I formulate the players’ payoff-functions. 
 
Stage 1:  
1. Homeowners and renters in the neighborhood individually, simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose whether to invest in social capital. The investment amount 
[ ]invc M depends on M , the number of initiating club members  in stage 1, as discussed 
in the previous section. A household invests if the investment generates a positive payoff. 
The social capital induced club good is provided if at least two households invest in 
social capital in stage 1.  
                                                 
7 All sets of players that are in the neighborhood in stage 2 use the same strategy in equilibrium with a 
probability of 1. 
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2. Homeowners and renters choose whether to stay or exit. If homeowners leave at the end 
of stage 1 they face transaction costs OTC  but receive a social capital induced house price 
premium ( )2 1P P P∆ = −  determined in the second stage. Relocation for renters is costless. 
 
Stage 2:  
3. Initial investors get access to the social capital induced benefits B  conditional on bearing 
the maintenance costs [ ],invm M M∆ . (Under the assumption of perfect and complete 
information, no household has an incentive to invest in stage 1 if this does not ensure 
access to social capital induced benefits in stage 2. Because the benefits are conditional 
on the maintenance effort, all initial investors will bear the maintenance cost in stage 2.) 
Non-investors in stage 1 are excluded from access to the benefits in the second stage. The 
benefits [ ]B M M+ ∆  depend on the number of club members in stage 2. 
4. The owners of undeveloped land (and the owners of vacated housing units) observe the 
investment and relocation decisions of the residents in stage 1 and then post their 
reservation prices for converting their plots of land competitively in the second stage. 
Each landowner individually chooses whether to develop. (The equilibrium price 2P  and 
the corresponding social capital induced house price premium P∆   are determined by the 
developer of the marginal plot of land. As will be demonstrated below, as long as new 
housing supply is not perfectly inelastic, the social club good induced equilibrium price 
premium is determined by the marginal owner of undeveloped land rather than by owners 
of units that were vacated in stage 1 (i.e., landlords). Landlords can be considered to be 
price takers. Their actions are not explicitly modeled without any loss of generality.) 
5. Households outside the neighborhood observe the investment and relocation decisions in 
stage 1. They then choose whether to enter the neighborhood and join the club.8 If they 
enter they pay P∆  plus the social capital maintenance cost [ ]newm M M+ ∆  in order to 
get access to the social capital induced benefits [ ]B M M+ ∆ . (Whether newcomers buy 
or rent in the last stage is immaterial because both options generate identical payoffs.)  
 
Next, I make a number of further assumptions and impose structural form to reflect the 
above characterization of neighborhood specific social capital and to keep the model tractable. 
                                                 
8 In line with the reasoning in Section 2.1, (non-stigmatized) newcomers are not excluded, provided they are 
willing to make a social capital maintenance effort in stage 2 (i.e., provided they are cooperative). Given that the 
social capital induced house premium will always be greater or equal to zero and given the model assumptions 
outlined below it would not make sense for a newcomer to enter the neighborhood without joining the club. 
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To begin with, the neighborhood is initially occupied by 1H  residents. Each household 
{ }11,  ... ,h H∈  occupies exactly one housing unit of fixed size, for convenience set to 1.9 The 
neighborhood has a total area L and contains open developable land 1.L H−  That is, the 
share of developed land in stage 1 is predetermined. The fractions α  of homeowners and 
1 α−  of renters in period 1 are predetermined as well.10 Apart from idiosyncratic differences 
in the preferences for homeownership all residents in the neighborhood are identical. (This 
simplifying assumption helps illustrating the difference between homeowners’ and renters’ 
investment incentives. It does so at the cost of generating an outcome in which all agents of 
the same group take the same action; invest or not invest. Alternative assumptions generate 
more refined outcomes but do not fundamentally alter the propositions made in this paper.)11 
The neighborhood is assumed to be sufficiently small such that it is not feasible to 
replicate the social capital stock with membership levels that ensure positive payoffs. The 
social capital induced benefits require social capital as sole ‘input factor in production’.  
In line with the argumentation in Section 2.1, in stage 1 a substantial initial ‘social capital 
investment’ [ ]invc M  is required from each of the M  initial investors. In stage 2 a smaller 
social capital ‘maintenance effort’ [ ],invm M M∆  is sufficient to maintain club membership. 
Similarly, each cooperating newcomer has to pay [ ]newm M M+ ∆  to ensure access to the club. 
Establishing new relationships is equally costly for initial investors and newcomers, however, 
newcomers have to establish rather than just maintain relationships with initial investors. The 
difference between the two cost functions is expressed in equation (2.3). 
For expository purposes it is assumed that the social capital induced gross benefits B  only 
accrue in stage 2. This simplifying assumption does not significantly alter the main 
predictions of the model. It captures the idea that club benefits need to be produced through a 
                                                 
9
 Existing homeowners in stage 1 are assumed only to own their own property and not parts of the 
undeveloped land in the neighborhood. That is, a homeowner bases the social capital investment decision solely 
on the social capital induced net benefits and on the value of the occupied property. Corporate or private owners 
of open land are assumed to be absent in that they do not have any direct influence on investment in social 
capital. 
10  This is a reasonable assumption. The homeownership status of properties is in reality predetermined 
because different property types differ in their relative landlord production efficiency (Linneman, 1985) and 
different neighborhoods differ in their inherent investment risk (Hilber, 2005). 
11
 Alternatively one could assume that homeowners (and/or renters) differ in the benefits they enjoy from 
access to social capital, generating an equilibrium, in which agents of the same group take different actions. For 
example, the benefits could be uniformly distributed over an interval [ ]0, .B M M + ∆  [ ]B M M+ ∆  follows the 
inverse U-form. Then the net benefits lie in the interval [ ];inv invm B m− − . The homeowners whose expected net 
benefits are larger than the investment costs will invest; M follows. 
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process of social capital accumulation. The net benefits of initial investors and newcomers in 
stage 2 can be expressed as: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]2, , ,inv invNB M M B M M m M M∆ = + ∆ − ∆   (3.1) 
[ ] [ ] [ ]2,new newNB M M B M M m M M+ ∆ = + ∆ − + ∆ . (3.2) 
First and second derivatives yield: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2, 2,inv new newNB NB B
 
M M M M M M
λ∂ ∂ ∂= = −
∂ + ∆ ∂ + ∆ ∂ + ∆
 (3.3) 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
2, 2,
2 2 2 0.
inv newNB NB B
M M M M M M
∂ ∂ ∂
= = <
∂ + ∆ ∂ + ∆ ∂ + ∆
 (3.4) 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) imply that the net benefit functions of both investors and 
newcomers are first increasing, then decreasing in the number of members in stage 2. 
Combining equations (2.3), (3.1) and (3.2), the additional net benefit of an investor 
compared to a newcomer in stage 2 can be formulated as: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]2, 2, 2,,inv new inv new new invNB M NB M M NB M M m M− −∆ = ∆ − + ∆ = ∆ . (4) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the net benefit functions for investors and newcomers. In the 
illustrated case, at membership level M, even the first newcomer generates higher marginal 
costs than marginal benefits. That is, newcomers to the neighborhood always dilute the club 
good induced net benefit.12  
 
Figure 1: Net Benefit as a Function of the Number of Newcomers in Stage 2 
 
 
M∆  
[ ]new invm M−∆  
[ ]2,newNB M M+ ∆  
[ ]2, ,invNB M M∆  
M  
Number of club 
members in period 2 
Net benefit 
in period 2 
  
                                                 
12
 Theoretically the first newcomers could increase the club good induced net benefits, as ( )B M M∂ ∂ + ∆  
may be greater than newλ for low membership levels M M+ ∆  in stage 2. However this would trigger 
competitive landowners to increase the supply of new housing until additional newcomers start to dilute the club 
good induced net benefits. The net benefits are further diluted until in housing market equilibrium the marginal 
newcomer is indifferent between entering the neighborhood and buying a housing unit or staying out and the 
marginal landowner is indifferent between developing and keeping the land vacant. 
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Relocation costs are in practice significantly higher for homeowners than for renters/ 
landlords. This is because relocation of a homeowner implies a property sale, while the 
relocation of a renter does not involve such a transaction.13 For expository purposes it is 
assumed that relocation of renters is costless for both renters and landlords but that owner-
occupiers face property transaction costs OTC  (e.g., search costs in the form of property 
advertising costs and estate agent fees, legal fees, and capital gains taxes). 
Before any newcomer enters the neighborhood in stage 2, the provision of social capital 
induced club goods is assumed to raise the hypothetically attainable utility level beyond that 
of other neighborhoods in the economy. However, this encourages newcomers to enter, 
decreasing the social capital induced net benefit [ ]2,newNB M M+ ∆  (dilution effect due to 
maintenance cost increase), increasing demand for housing and increasing incentives of 
landowners to convert open land into housing. 14 
Each landowner { }11,  ... ,l L H∈ −  is assumed to have a unique reservation price ltP  that 
determines whether the corresponding plot of land is converted into housing. The reservation 
price is the result of individual opportunity cost considerations. Landowners with low 
opportunity costs convert first, while landowners with high opportunity costs (for example 
because of strong preferences for preservation) wait until the price exceeds their reservation 
price. House prices tP  are assumed to be determined competitively such that in each stage 
house prices equal the marginal landowner’s opportunity cost of conversion: [ ]t tP H = 
[ ].t tMOC H  Simple first differencing yields: 
P MOC∆ = ∆ ,  (5) 
whereas [ ] [ ]2 2 1 1P P H P H∆ = −  and [ ] [ ]2 2 1 1MOC MOC H MOC H∆ = − . 
Finally, it is assumed that the marginal opportunity cost curve ( )MOC H is more inelastic 
in neighborhoods that are more developed, implying that  
MOC MOC H L ∆ = ∆     with  ( ) 0.
MOC
H L
∂∆
>
∂
 (5.1) 
                                                 
13 Haurin and Gill (2002) estimate the transaction costs of selling a house in the United States as the sum of 3 
percent of the house value and 4 percent of total household earning. This is likely a lower bound estimate of the 
true property transaction cost. In practice relocation costs of renters and landlords (i.e., search costs, short-term 
vacancy costs) are not zero but substantially lower than the property transaction costs faced by homeowners.  
14 It can be assumed that all potential newcomers are also newcomers to the housing market. Hence they do 
not face any transaction costs related to the sale of a property. Alternatively, in a setting with mobility shocks 
(see Section 2.3 below), it could be assumed that previous transaction costs are sunk. 
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This alleged positive relationship between land scarcity and the inelasticity of new 
housing supply is both theoretically and empirically motivated and is further justified in 
Section 3.2. Appendix Figure A1 provides a graphical illustration of the argument.  
 
Payoff Functions 
Under the above assumptions we can express the payoffs of homeowners hOpi , renters 
h
Rpi , 
landowners lLpi  and newcomers 
n
Npi  as follows: 
 
( ) ( )2,1 1
1 1
h h
invh h inv
R
R NB R P
I c
r r
pi
 
− − ∆ 
= − + − 
+ +  
 (6.1) 
( ) 2,1
1 1
h
invh h inv h O
O
R NB P TCI c R
r r
pi
 
− ∆ − 
= − + + 
+ +  
 (6.2) 
{ }2 2l l lL D P Ppi = −   (6.3) 
{ }2,n nN newE NB Ppi = − ∆ , (6.4) 
 
whereas r  denotes the discount rate, { }0,1hI ∈  and { }0,1hR ∈  denote the choices of 
household h  whether to invest in social capital and whether to relocate at the end of stage 1, 
{ }0,1lD ∈  denotes the choice of landowner l  whether to convert the open plot of land into 
housing, { }0,1nE ∈  denotes the choice of newcomer n  whether to enter the neighborhood, 
and finally ( )2 1P P P∆ = −  denotes the social capital induced increase in house prices. 
 
Housing Market Equilibrium in Stage 2 
Now assume that some neighbors invest in stage 1 and the club good is provided in stage 
2. Equilibrium in the housing market is achieved when the following two conditions hold: 
 (i) The marginal supplier of housing is exactly indifferent between selling/renting-out and 
keeping the land/property vacant and no landowner or landlord has any incentive to 
deviate from his or her decision. 
(ii) The marginal newcomer is exactly indifferent between entering the neighborhood and 
staying out and no household has any incentive to move in or out of the neighborhood.  
 
The first condition implies that the house price in each stage must equal the marginal 
landowner’s opportunity cost of conversion. The second condition implies that  
P∆ = [ ]2,newNB M M+ ∆ . (7) 
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Combining equations (5), (5.1) and (7), the housing market equilibrium can be defined as: 
 
[ ]1 2,newP MOC H L NB M M ∆ = ∆ = + ∆  . (8) 
 
Equilibrium Outcomes in Stage 1 
Next, I investigate the implications of the equilibrium condition (8) on the investment and 
relocation decisions of renters and homeowners in the first stage. Consider first the decision 
of a representative renter h  whether to “invest and stay” or “not invest and exit” (the other 
two sets of choices are not sensible15). Using equations (2.3), (4), (6.1) and (8) the payoff of 
renter h ’s choice (invest, stay) can be expressed as  
 
[ ] [ ]1, 0 0.
1
new invh h h
R inv
m M
I R c M
r
pi −
 ∆
 = = = − − <   + 
 (9) 
 
Because the individual investment cost invc  always exceeds the difference in maintenance 
costs between newcomers and investors new invm −∆  (see equation 2.3), in equilibrium, renters 
cannot recover invc  and, hence, cannot achieve a positive payoff by investing.
16
 In contrast 
0, 1 0h h hR I Rpi  = = =  . Consequently, if social capital investment is the equilibrium outcome, 
since landlords have an incentive to increase rents by the equilibrium value, all ( ) 11 Hα−  
renters exit at the end of stage 1 and the vacated houses are filled with newcomers in stage 2. 
Now consider whether it can be optimal for homeowners to invest in stage 1 taking the 
equilibrium condition (8) as given. The payoff of a homeowner differs from that of a renter in 
one important aspect. While house price capitalization effects increase housing costs and 
thereby decrease the payoffs of social capital investments for renters, homeowners are not 
bothered by such effects because they ‘rent to themselves’ (i.e., they can internalize the 
benefits from their investments).17 Using equations (4), (6.2) and (8) the payoff of homeowner 
h ’s set of choices can be expressed as follows: 
( ) [ ] [ ]11, 0
1
new invh h h
O inv
MOC H L m M
I R c M
r
pi
−
∆ + ∆
 = = = −  +
,  (“invest and stay”) (10.1) 
                                                 
15
 The combination (don’t invest and exit) is always strictly preferred to (invest and exit). Because of the rent 
increase in stage 2, the combination (don’t invest and exit) is always strictly preferred to (don’t invest and stay). 
16 This implies that landlords, who observe their tenants’ involvement in neighborhood specific social 
activities (i.e., investment in social capital), can pocket the proceeds in form of increased rents. The reasoning is 
that at the end of stage 1 the renters’ investments are sunk. 
17 Similarly, in a setting with mobility shocks, homeowners who have to sell their property can pocket the 
proceeds from their investment. 
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( )10, 1
1
Oh h h
O
MOC H L TC
I R
r
pi
∆ −
 = = =  +
,  (“free-ride”) (10.2) 
0, 0 0,h h hO I Rpi  = = =   (“do nothing”) (10.3) 
( ) [ ]11, 1
1
Oh h h
O inv
MOC H L TC
I R c M
r
pi
∆ −
 = = = −  +
. (“invest and exit”) (10.4) 
 
It is quite obvious that “invest and exit” cannot be the optimal strategy; it is strictly 
dominated by “free-riding”. Whether “invest and stay”, “free-riding” or “do nothing” is the 
preferred strategy depends on the model parameters. Using equations (10.1) to (10.3), the 
investment conditions can be formulated as:  
( ) [ ] [ ]1 ,O inv new invTC r c M m M−> + − ∆  (investing dominates free-riding) (11.1) 
( ) [ ] [ ]1 1 .inv new invHMOC r c M m ML −
 ∆ > + − ∆ 
 
 (investing dominates no action) (11.2) 
 
Propositions 
The first proposition can be derived by comparing the payoffs of investing renters 
(equation 9) and homeowners (equation 10.1): 
[ ] [ ] 11, 0 1, 0 0
1
h h
O R
MOC H L
I R I R
r
pi pi
 ∆  
= = − = = = >
+
. (12) 
 
Proposition 1: As long as the supply of new housing in a neighborhood is not perfectly 
elastic homeowners are more likely to invest in neighborhood specific social capital 
than renters. 
 
In empirical terms, all else equal, homeowners should be more socially interactive with 
neighbors and should be more likely to participate in neighborhood clubs.18  
The second prediction can be derived from equations (11.1) and (11.2).  Consider a 
setting with high property transaction costs OTC  such that investing dominates free-riding 
(i.e., the condition formulated in equation (11.1) holds). In this case, the investment condition 
formulated in equation (11.2) becomes critical. Proposition 2 can be formulated as follows: 
 
Proposition 2: In a world with high property transaction costs, the positive link 
between individual homeownership attainment and individual neighborhood specific 
                                                 
18  The model predicts that while only homeowners invest in social capital in period 1, new neighbors 
(homeowners and renters) are willing to provide a social capital maintenance effort in period 2. Hence, in 
empirical terms, the model merely predicts that on average – over a longer period of time – renters are less likely 
to socially interact with neighbors or to join neighborhood associations compared to homeowners. The model 
does not predict that renters do not contribute to social capital at all. 
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social capital investment is stronger in more built-up neighborhoods with more 
inelastic supply of new housing. 
 
In empirical terms, individual homeownership should be more strongly positively linked 
to social interactions among immediate neighbors and to participation in neighborhood clubs 
in more built-up neighborhoods.  
In contrast to neighborhood specific social capital, non-neighborhood specific social 
capital – for example social capital at work – is not expected to affect house values at the 
place of residence. Hence, as a corollary, Proposition 3 can be formulated as follows: 
 
Proposition 3: Homeowners are not more likely to invest in non-neighborhood specific 
forms of social capital. Land scarcity does not have a positive effect on the link 
between homeownership and non-neighborhood specific forms of social capital. 
 
In empirical terms, individual homeownership should not be positively linked to the 
number of social interactions with co-workers outside work or to participation in service or 
fraternal organizations. Land scarcity should not have a positive impact of the link between 
homeownership and social capital in theses cases. Moreover, to the extent that respondents are 
time constrained individuals that allocate a certain time budget to social interactions and 
substitute less beneficial forms for more beneficial ones, homeowners may even be less likely 
to socialize with co-workers or with likeminded in service and fraternal organizations. 
 
The Role of the Homeownership Rate 
So far the analysis has ignored the effect of the homeownership rate α  on the 
equilibrium outcome. One implication of identical payoff functions for each set of players is 
that in an equilibrium with social capital investment all 1Hα  homeowners must be initial 
investors, that is, * 1M Hα= . Given 
*M , the determination of *M∆  is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The figure depicts the adjustment process to the equilibrium (solid lines with arrows) and the 
effect of an inflow of newcomers in period 2 on the payoffs of initial investors and 
newcomers (dashed lines) in a setting with high transaction costs and intermediate elasticity 
of new housing supply. Each additional newcomer to the neighborhood dilutes 
[ ]2,newNB M M+ ∆ . At the same time, [ ]MOC H  increases with each additional housing unit 
built (the steepness of the curve is determined by the land scarcity H L  in the 
neighborhood). Equilibrium is achieved when [ ]2,newNB M M+ ∆  exactly equals the club good 
induced price premium [ ] [ ]2 1P MOC H L MOC H MOC H ∆ = ∆ = −  demanded by the 
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marginal developer (point A). Note in this context that in stage 2 all residents will also be club 
members, that is, 2H M M= + ∆  and hence [ ] [ ]2MOC H MOC M M= + ∆ . In equilibrium, 
the marginal newcomer’s payoff from cooperating is exactly zero (point C), while the total 
payoff of all investing homeowners (amount BC) is still positive.  
 
Figure 2: Adjustment Process to Equilibrium and Equilibrium Payoffs 
 
* *
2
M M
H
+ ∆
=
 
Club members 
in period 2 
[ ] [ ]1MOC MOC M M MOC H∆ = + ∆ −  
*
n
Npi  
*
h
Opi  2,inv
NB  
*M∆  
C 
B 
A 
Payoff /  
Net benefit 
1n nN Epi  =   
1, 0h h hO I Rpi  = =   
1H  * 1M Hα=  
 
The membership levels in stage 1 and stage 2 are indeed stable equilibrium outcomes 
because (i) they ensure a non-negative payoff for all club members and (ii) no member has an 
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium. More generally, as long as the investment 
conditions formulated in equations (11.1) and (11.2) hold, the equilibrium membership level 
*M  in stage 1 and the change in the membership level *M∆ in stage 2 can be formulated as: 
*
1M Hα=     (13.1) 
( )* *11- newM H M H Lα  ∆ = +   , (13.2) 
where ( ) 11- Hα  denotes the empty (renter-occupied) housing units at the end of stage 1 that 
need to be re-occupied by newcomers in stage 2 and where *
newM H L    denotes the 
additional newcomers in stage 2 that occupy new housing units. 
The homeownership rate α  influences the initial investor’s equilibrium payoff in two 
ways: An increase in α  raises *M  and thereby first increases then decreases the investor’s 
total payoff. At the same time, an increase in α  reduces the number of renters exiting 
voluntarily at the end of stage 1, reducing the inflow of newcomers *M∆  at the beginning of 
stage 2 and thereby raising the investor’s equilibrium payoff. The total effect is ambiguous. 
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2.3 Alternative Theoretical Frameworks and Derived Predictions 
In the model presented above, relocation is endogenously determined and homeowners 
and renters differ only in that relocation of a renter does not involve property transaction 
costs. Adding a mobility shock to the model adds complexity but does not alter the main 
predictions in significant ways. In a world with voluntary relocation and mobility shocks, the 
investment/free-riding decision is not only determined by transaction costs but also by the 
likelihood that a homeowner receives a shock (i.e., free-riding is more likely if the probability 
of a shock is high). Similarly, a homeowner’s payoff from investing in neighborhood specific 
social capital is less likely to be positive if the probability of a mobility shock is high.  
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) provide a formal analysis of the effects of mobility 
shocks on social capital investment decisions. In their model mobility is induced by shocks, 
whereas homeowners have a lower propensity than renters to receive a shock. Consequently, 
homeowners have greater incentives to be ‘better citizens’. It is worth noting that DiPasquale 
and Glaeser’s (1999) model and the one presented above also differ in the mechanisms 
through which individual social capital investments lead to improved neighborhood quality. 
In DiPasquale and Glaeser’s framework social capital ‘improves the ability of neighbors to 
enjoy each other’s investments in local amenities’. In the model presented here, social capital 
facilitates the production of utility generating club goods and individual social capital 
contribution guarantees access to the club good related benefits. The two models differ in 
another important aspect, DiPasquale and Glaeser do not model housing supply conditions. 
As a consequence the model presented here makes additional (more refined) predictions with 
respect to homeowners’ and renters’ decisions whether to invest in social capital. Specifically, 
modeling housing market conditions generates Propositions 2 and 3, which are tested below. 
 
3  Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 The Data 
The data is derived from five main sources. The first source is the Restricted Use Data 
version of the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) undertaken by the 
Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University between 
July 2000 and February 2001. 19  As the survey title implies, this is the first attempt at 
                                                 
19
 ‘Restricted use data’ refers to the original Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey Restricted Use 
Data provided by Harvard University through the Roper Center of the University of Connecticut. According to 
the survey documentation (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2001), the interviews were conducted by 
telephone using random-digit-dialing. See the survey documentation for further details on the survey design. 
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widespread systematic measurement of social capital, particularly within communities. The 
survey measures various manifestations of social capital as well as its suspected correlates in 
41 U.S. ‘communities’ (a metro area, a city, or one or several counties). The ‘communities’ 
are listed in Appendix Table A1. The Restricted Use (in contrast to the Public Use) Data 
version of the SCCBS provides geographical information including Census tract identifiers 
for the survey respondents. The Census tract identifiers are subsequently used to merge the 
SCCBS data with data from the other four main sources: the National Land Cover Data 1992 
(NLCD 92), the Natural Amenity Scale Data (NASD), the NBER data repository, and the 
2000 U.S. Census. Because the SCCBS Census tract information is based on 1990 boundary 
definitions, all data is geographically matched to 1990 boundaries. 
The NLCD 92 reports raster data including 21 different land uses with a spatial resolution 
of 30 meters for 49 U.S. states. The Wharton GIS Lab geographically matched the raster data 
to the Census tract level. This tract level land use data set can be used to derive the preferred 
proxy measure for the inelasticity of new housing supply in a neighborhood: the share of 
developed land in a Census tract. (A Census block group may be a better approximation of a 
neighborhood in less urbanized areas. Unfortunately block level data is not consistently 
available. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the land availability in a Census block 
group and the corresponding tract are highly correlated.) The measure is defined as: 
 
% Developed land (residential, commercial, industrial, transport)-Developed  =
Developable land (all land except water, ice, barren, wetlands) . (14) 
 
The NASD provides detailed topography data at the U.S. county level. The data is 
derived from the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture and is 
used in the empirical analysis below to instrument for the share of developed land in a Census 
tract. Similarly, the NBER data repository provides data on state level mortgage subsidy rates, 
which are used as an instrument to identify a survey respondent’s homeownership status.20  
Finally, the U.S. Census 2000 provides additional Census tract level controls including 
the homeownership rate and the linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity.21 Alesina and LaFerrara 
(2000) show that the latter two variables affect measures of social capital.  
While the total SCCBS communities-sample consists of 26,230 adults, the regression 
samples are somewhat smaller due to missing values.22 Most importantly, for some Census 
                                                 
20
 The NBER provides a program (TAXSIM) that calculates federal and state income tax liabilities from 
survey data. As a ‘side product’ the NBER reports state-level income tax rates and corresponding mortgage 
subsidy rates. The URL is http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates (last accessed on July 24, 2007). 
21 The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) provided data access. The data 
was geographically matched to 1990 Census tract boundaries using official U.S. Census relationship files. 
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tracts that belong to the forty-one communities sample no corresponding land use data could 
be matched. The final regression data set consists of four measures of individual social capital 
investment and numerous household and location specific variables. All variables are 
described in Section 3.3 below. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.  
 
3.2 Land Availability and the Elasticity of New Housing Supply  
The empirical work that follows uses the share of developed land in a Census tract as a 
proxy measure for the local inelasticity of new housing supply. The choice of this proxy 
measure is theoretically and empirically motivated. To begin with, the sheer impossibility of 
converting land in built-up neighborhoods explains why highly developed locations have a 
more inelastic supply of new housing compared to locations with plenty of open space.  
The second argument is a purely mechanical one; mathematically, as long as the supply 
curve has a positive price intercept, even a linear supply curve generates a positive 
relationship between land scarcity and the supply inelasticity. A positive price intercept 
merely implies that the present value of future land rents from farming is greater than zero. 
The third line of reasoning is founded in the endogenous zoning literature, which 
considers land use restrictions as political outcomes determined by voting and lobbying. 
While owners of developed land have an incentive to limit new housing supply to protect the 
value of their assets, owners of undeveloped land have an interest in keeping land use 
regulation flexible. Hence, to the extent that land use controls are the outcome of a political 
process, new housing supply should be more inelastic in more developed locations where 
owners of developed land (homeowners and landlords) are more numerous and politically 
influential that owners of undeveloped land (e.g., farmers). Consistent with this reasoning, 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006) provide empirical evidence that land scarcity has a causal 
positive effect on the local regulatory restrictiveness. Various other studies provide support 
for this finding. For example, Rudel (1989) demonstrates that municipalities in Connecticut 
adopted land use laws later if they (i) are at a greater distance to New York City and (ii) had a 
greater share of farmland. Moreover, increases in restrictiveness occurred in those places that 
experienced the largest declines in farming during the 1960s. In a similar vein, Fischel (2004) 
documents that land use regulation typically originates in the centers of large cities and then 
spreads to the surrounding suburbs and towns. Finally, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) 
find a very high ‘regulatory tax’ for Manhattan condominiums but much lower values for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 The survey was also conducted nationally. The national sample consists of 3,003 adults. The restriction to 
the ‘communities’ sample permits the use of community sample fixed effects for all observations in the sample. 
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entire metro area. Overall, these studies overwhelmingly support the view that undeveloped 
land can be more easily converted into housing in less regulated locations at the edge of cities 
but that conversion is costly and involves large time lags in more developed locations. 
The final argument is based on the real options literature, which assumes that land 
redevelopment is costly and developable open land therefore has an option value (Titman, 
1985; Capozza and Helsley, 1990; Capozza and Li, 1994; Novy-Marx, 2005). In such a 
setting, when a neighborhood becomes built-up, the incremental opportunity cost of building 
an additional housing unit increases exponentially, implying inelastic supply of new housing. 
While the evidence discussed above is circumstantial, Hilber and Mayer (2004) estimate 
a structural model, using a well-identified strategy, to directly estimate supply elasticities for 
locations with more and less developable land for future construction. Their findings suggest 
that more developed communities indeed have more inelastic supply of new housing and a 
greater extent of house price capitalization of local public school spending and local 
amenities. In a related study, Brasington (2002) demonstrates, by splitting a sample into 
houses on the interior and the edge of the urban area, that capitalization is weaker towards the 
edge where housing supply elasticities and developer activity are greater. In a similar vein, 
McDonald and McMillen (2000) show for Suburban Chicago that residential development is 
greater in areas with a large proportion of agricultural land. 
 
3.3 Empirical Specifications, Choice of Estimators and Identification Strategy 
The base specification (Specification 1) estimates the effect of a survey respondent’s 
homeownership status (i.e., whether he or she owns) on particular measures of individual 
social capital investments. Two of the measures are neighborhood specific (social 
interactions with immediate neighbors23 and participation in neighborhood associations) and 
two are non-neighborhood specific (social interactions with co-workers outside work and 
participation in service and fraternal organizations). Specification 1 can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2
1
% .
K
k+2
k
Individual contribution to social capital =
own developed control  kβ β β β ε
=
+ + + +∑
 (15) 
The respondent’s homeownership status (own) – the variable of interest in the base 
specification – is 1 if the respondent is a homeowner and 0 if he or she is renting. All else 
                                                 
23 The survey question only asks for the number of interactions and does not distinguish different interaction-
types or intensities. A log-transformation of the dependent variable was performed because initial specification 
tests revealed that a semi-log specification achieves a better fit. One interaction was added to the total number of 
interactions in order to avoid loosing a significant fraction of observations with zero interactions. It should be 
noted that estimates with an untransformed dependent variable yield similar qualitative results.  
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equal, individual homeownership should be positively related to neighborhood specific social 
capital 1( 0)β >  (Proposition 1) but unrelated or – because of substitution effects – possibly 
negatively related to non-neighborhood specific social capital 1( 0)β ≤  (Proposition 3). 
Besides the share developed land (%developed), the base specification includes a large 
number of location and household specific controls. The full set of controls is listed in Table 
1. Previous research either predicts or has demonstrated that these variables are related to 
various forms of social capital. The list of location specific controls includes a number of 
Census tract specific variables plus community sample fixed effects (one dummy variable for 
each of the SCCBS-communities in the sample) to control for community specific time-
invariant unobservable characteristics. The Census tract specific controls are the 
homeownership rate, the income Gini coefficient, the linguistic heterogeneity, the ethnic 
heterogeneity, the share of housing units in multi-unit buildings, the share of housing units in 
single family detached homes and the population density in the developed area. The latter 
variable is included as a proxy for the average proximity of residents. High residential 
proximity may facilitate social interactions among neighbors because of shorter distances; on 
the other hand, it may also create an environment of anonymity making social interactions 
among immediate neighbors less likely, especially in multi-unit building environments. 
The list of survey respondent specific controls includes the following variables: the 
number of years lived in the local community, whether the respondent expects to stay in the 
community for at least 5 more years24, commuter characteristics, the race, the gender, the age 
and age squared 25 , whether the respondent has children, household income category 
dummies, the marital status, dummies for the highest education completed and dummies for 
the current employment status. The effects of all these control variables on the different 
measures of individual social capital investment are reported in Appendix Table A2. Because 
the coefficients and statistical significance levels of the control variables are overall similar 
across all specifications, results are reported for the base specification only.  
Specification 2 differs from the base specification in that it additionally includes the 
interaction effect between the survey respondent’s homeownership status (own) and the share 
of developed land in the tract (%developed): 
                                                 
24  Households are expected to engage more in social interactions if they plan to stay longer in their 
neighborhood or at their work place, suggesting a positive sign of the variable’s coefficient. 
25 Age and age squared are jointly included to control for the possibility that returns to various forms of social 
capital differ over the stages of a person’s life cycle. Results reported in Table A2 confirm this hypothesis. 
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× + +∑
 (16) 
Theory predicts that individual homeownership should be more strongly positively 
related to contributions to neighborhood specific forms of social capital in more developed 
places 3( 0)β > , where such contributions have a stronger positive effect on property values 
(Proposition 2). Again, theory makes a different prediction for contributions to non-
neighborhood specific forms of social capital; the respondent’s homeownership status and the 
interaction effect ‘homeownership × developed’ should not be positively linked to non-
neighborhood specific forms of social capital ( 3 0β ≤ ; Proposition 3). 
The two specifications are first estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).26 Next, 
various endogeneity concerns are addressed by applying a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) 
estimator. The first potential endogeneity concern is related to the land scarcity variable; 
neighborhoods with more active homeowners may enact more restrictive zoning laws and 
other regulations that limit housing supply. Similarly, one could make a case that the 
population density variable is endogenously determined; restrictive zoning laws may affect 
the population density in the developed area of the neighborhood for example via minimum 
lot size restrictions. The endogeneity concern related to the land scarcity variable is 
somewhat alleviated by the fact that the land use data was collected in 1992, while all other 
variables including the homeownership status of the survey respondents and the social capital 
measures are from the year 2000. Social capital investments in 2000 should not explain the 
share of developed land 8 years earlier. Secondly, if more active homewners enact stricter 
zoning that preserves open land then one should find that the coefficient of the interaction 
term ‘own×developed’ has a negative sign. However, as is demonstrated below, the opposite 
is the case. Thus, the bias goes against the predicted results.27 Nevertheless in order to fully 
address the endogeneity concerns related to the land scarcity and the population density 
variables, instrumental variable estimates were carried out. As instruments for land scarcity 
                                                 
26 The probability of participation in neighborhood or service/fraternal organizations could also be estimated 
using logit or probit models. However, a linear probability model is preferred because the interpretation of 
interaction effects in logit and probit models is not straightforward. This is because the magnitude of an 
interaction effect in a non-linear model does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can be of 
opposite sign. Standard statistical software does not calculate the correct standard errors (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
27
 One might also be concerned that land scarcity is related to household mobility and that the empirical 
specification might not sufficiently control for mobility. However land scarcity is positively related to intended 
mobility (i.e., households in urbanized areas are more mobile). Hence, if anything, omitting mobility would also 
bias against finding the proposed effect. Moreover, adding a variable for the interaction between individual 
homeownership and intended mobility has virtually no effect on the coefficients of the variables of interest. 
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and population density in the developed area, physical limits on the housing supply in the 
Census tract are used. The list of instrumental variables includes the share of wetland in the 
Census tract and a number of county specific dummy variables for different topography types 
(flat plains, smooth plains, irregular plains, tablelands and moderate relief, open low 
mountains, low mountains and high mountains). These features of the Census tracts are 
expected to explain the share of developed land and the population density within the 
developed area but should be unrelated to the error term. As Wooldridge (2002) 
demonstrates, the product of an instrument for a given endogenous variable and an 
exogenous component of an interaction term is also a valid instrument. Consequently, the 
interaction term ‘own × developed’ is identified using the following instruments: the 
respondent’s homeownership status interacted with the share wetland in the Census tract plus 
the homeownership status variable interacted with each of  the 7 topography type dummies.  
Another potential endogeneity concern is related to the survey respondent’s 
homeownership status. Omitted variables that may explain the respondent’s homeownership 
status may also be correlated to the four measures of social capital. In order to address this 
potential issue – and provide a further robustness check – additional instrumental variables 
are used to identify the respondent’s homeownership status and the variable’s interaction 
with land scarcity. The identification strategy exploits two facts: (i) that homeowners in the 
United States can deduct mortgage interest from their income taxes and (ii) that this tax 
subsidy differs across U.S. states.28  Rather than using each survey respondent’s specific 
subsidy rate, the total maximum mortgage subsidy rate by state is used. This variable 
measures the state-specific maximum total subsidy related to both federal and state income 
tax. The measure has the advantage that it is independent of individual decisions as well as of 
the within state income distribution. The total maxim subsidy rate should explain a survey 
respondent’s homeownership propensity but should not be a function of individual social 
capital contributions. More precisely, the maximum subsidy rate should have a differential 
impact on a respondent’s homeownership propensity depending on his or her income (i.e., 
mortgage rate subsidies benefit higher incomes much more than lower incomes). Hence, the 
total maximum mortgage subsidy rate by state interacted with each income category dummy 
is used as an instrument to identify the homeownership status of the survey respondent. 
Again following Woolridge (2002), the instruments to identify the interaction term 
                                                 
28
 This is because states differ in their state income tax rates and in their treatment of deducting mortgage 
interest from income taxes. 
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‘own × developed’ are derived as the interactions of the instruments for the respondent’s 
homeownership status and the instruments for the share developed land. 
Standard errors in all reported specifications are clustered by county. Clustering by 
county is necessary because one set of instrumental variables is county specific.29  
 
3.4 Regression Results 
Results for key explanatory variables are first reported for the two neighborhood specific 
measures of social capital (Table 2), then for the two non-neighborhood specific measures 
(Table 3). Table 4 reports results for specifications with instrumented homeownership and 
Table 5 portrays the ‘economic significance’ of the various effects. Finally, Appendix Table 
A2 reports results for the various control variables. Because the coefficients of the controls 
overwhelmingly have expected signs and, for each social capital measure, vary little across 
specifications, results are only reported for the base specification – column (2) of Tables 2 
and 3.30 Readers interested in the effects of the control variables are referred to Table A2.  
 
Neighborhood-Specific Measures of Social Capital 
Panel A of Table 2 reports estimates for the number of social interactions with immediate 
neighbors per year. The first two columns examine Proposition 1; all else equal homeowners 
should talk more often to their immediate neighbors. While column (1) reports OLS results 
for the base specification with no controls except community fixed effects, column (2) reports 
results for the same specification but with all controls (equation 15). The coefficient on the 
individual homeownership status variable is highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) in 
both cases. The effect is less than half as big, in quantitative terms, in the specification with 
all controls. Even so, the effect is economically meaningful. As Table 5 reveals, all else equal 
and measured at the sample mean homeowners have about 12 additional social interactions 
with immediate neighbors compared to renters (who, on average, interact 102 times per year 
with their neighbors). Overall, the first two columns provide strong support for Proposition 1. 
Column (2) also reveals that the share developed land and the population density in the 
                                                 
29
 In an earlier version of this paper, standard errors were clustered by Census tract following the argument 
that the main variable of interest – the share developed land – is the same for all households within a tract. 
Results are very similar, both in a quantitative and statistical sense. However, clustering by county (the more 
aggregated geographical level) is the more accurate/conservative approach. Note that clustering corrects for 
within group autocorrelation and across group heteroskedasticity, implying robust standard errors. 
30 The effects of many controls vary however depending on whether neighborhood specific or non-
neighborhood specific measures of social capital are considered, in line with the argumentation in this paper. For 
example, respondents with children are much more socially interactive at the neighborhood level (where many 
children-specific club goods are provided) but are significantly less socially interactive at work and in service 
and fraternity organizations, consistent with the view that time constrained households substitute less beneficial 
forms of social interactions for more beneficial ones. 
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developed area of a Census tract are related with opposite signs to the number of social 
interactions with immediate neighbors. While the coefficient of the share developed land 
measure has a positive sign, the coefficient on the population density variable has a negative 
sign, consistent with the findings in Brueckner and Largey (2006). 
The remaining five columns examine Proposition 2; all else equal individual 
homeownership should be more strongly positively linked to social interactions among 
immediate neighbors in more built-up neighborhoods. All five columns report results for 
Specification 2 with interaction effects, as outlined in equation (16). To begin with columns 
(3) and (4) report results of OLS estimates (without and with controls). The results of both 
specifications provide strong support for Proposition 2. The coefficient of the interaction term 
‘own×developed’ is positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level in both cases. 
The coefficient is somewhat smaller in the second specification but adding the numerous 
control variables has a quite limited effect on the size of the coefficient. The effect, while not 
particularly large, is reasonably meaningful in economic terms. The quantitative effect 
reported in Table 5 implies that the move from an ‘average’ neighborhood that is halfway 
developed to one that is 86 percent developed (increase by one standard deviation), increases 
a homeowner’s number of social interactions by 4.1 but reduces a renter’s number of social 
interactions by 1.8. 31  Interestingly, when adding the controls, the independent (positive) 
effect of the respondent’s homeownership status variable on the number of social interactions 
with neighbors becomes completely statistically insignificant, implying that homeowners are 
not per se ‘better citizens’. Instead the difference in the behavior of homeowners and renters 
is entirely driven by the land scarcity in the neighborhood. Note also that the independent 
effect of the share developed land variable becomes completely statistically insignificant, 
when the controls are added, suggesting that land scarcity has no independent effect. 
The 2SLS-specifications reported in columns (5) to (7) differ from those reported in 
columns (3) and (4) only in that instrumental variables – as described in Section 3.3 – are 
used to identify the share developed land (columns 5 and 6) and additionally the population 
density in the developed area (column 7). Column (5) reports results for a specification 
without additional controls, while the last two columns include controls. The results again 
provide strong support for Proposition 2. In fact, not only does the positive interaction effect 
                                                 
31 The negative sign of this effect is due to the negative coefficient on the %-developed variable. Note that the 
coefficient is not statistically significant and is used to calculate the effect for homeowners and renters. Hence, 
the gap of 5.9 interactions between the two groups is unchanged if the statistically insignificant effect is ignored. 
The finding of a negative effect for renters is consistent with theory. To the extent that other factors induce 
renters to invest, one would expect that rent adjustments negatively affect the renters’ social capital investments. 
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‘own×developed’ remain statistically significant at the 1% level in all three specifications but 
the coefficient increases in size, in line with the reasoning in Section 3.3 that the endogeneity 
of land scarcity creates a downward bias. It should be noted however that the effects are also 
more imprecisely measured. Adding the various controls reduces the size of the coefficient 
somewhat but the coefficient is reasonably stable across specifications, suggesting that 
potentially omitted variables are unlikely to have a relevant impact on the results. The 
quantitative effects are quite meaningful. A one standard deviation increase of the land 
scarcity variable, measured at the sample mean, increases the difference in the number of 
social interactions between homeowners and renters by +13.3 and +12.8, respectively, 
compared to +5.9 in the OLS estimate reported in column (4). It is worth noting that the 
independent effect of the respondent’s homeownership status remains statistically completely 
insignificant. The independent effect of the share developed variable is now negative and 
significant. The effect of the population density variable remains negative and marginally 
significant independent of whether the variable is assumed to be endogenous or not.   
First stage F-statistics (reported in columns 5 to 7) for the joint test of the instruments are 
reasonably high for the two variables of interest; the interaction term ‘own×developed’ and 
the share developed land (see Table 2 for details).32 Various other tests were carried out: 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio tests examine whether the models are 
identified. Hansen-J statistics were calculated to test whether the instruments are valid. 
Finally, Wu-Hausman F-tests and Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2-tests were carried out in order to 
test the hypothesis that a given regressor is exogenous. All specifications comfortable pass 
the relevant tests. Joint tests of endogeneity reject the hypothesis that the instrumented 
regressors are exogenous with at least 95 percent confidence in all specifications. 
Next turn to Panel B of Table 2. Panel B reports linear probability estimates for the 
respondent’s participation in neighborhood associations. The dependent variable is 1 if the 
household participates and 0 otherwise. Apart from the dependent variable, all seven reported 
specifications are identical to those reported in Panel A. Overall, results are very similar 
qualitatively to those reported in Panel A. All results again provide strong support for 
Propositions 1 and 2. Namely, estimates of the base specification reported in columns (1) and 
(2) suggest that individual homeownership is positively and statistically highly significantly 
related to participation in neighborhood associations. The quantitative effect reported in 
                                                 
32
 First stage F-statistics test whether the 2SLS estimator is biased in the direction of the OLS estimator. The 
first stage F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the first stage regression. The first 
stage F-statistic should be large, ideally exceeding 10, for TSLS inference to be fully reliable (see e.g., Bound et 
al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; or Stock et al., 2002 for a more in-depth discussion). 
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Table 5 is economically quite meaningful. All else equal, the probability that a homeowner 
participates in a neighborhood club is 11.5% points higher compared to a renter. Since only 
14.1% of all renters in the sample participate in a neighborhood association this implies that 
homeowners are about 82% more likely to join a neighborhood club compared to renters.  
The remaining specifications reported in columns (3) to (7) provide strong support for 
Proposition 2. Individual homeownership is more strongly positively linked to participation 
in neighborhood associations in more developed locations. Interestingly, in the OLS-
specifications the coefficient on ‘own×developed’ increases slightly when the controls are 
added. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term is remarkably stable across the three 
2SLS-specifications (ranging from 0.16 to 0.18), independent of whether controls are 
included or not and independent of whether population density is instrumented for. Again 
similar to the results reported in Panel A, the magnitude of the effect of the interaction term 
increases substantially in the 2SLS-estimates compared to the OLS ones. The effects are 
quantitatively very meaningful. According to the OLS-specification with controls reported in 
column (4), a one standard deviation increase in the share developed land increases the 
participation probability-gap between homeowners and renters by 3.6% points or, measured 
at the sample mean (25% of respondents participate in neighborhood associations), by 14.4%. 
The effects are even larger for the 2SLS-estimates reported in columns (6) and (7). A one 
standard deviation increase in the share developed land increases the participation probability 
gap by 6.1% points and 5.7% points respectively, implying an increase in the participation 
probability by 24.4% and 22.8% respectively. It is worth nothing that the independent effect 
of the homeownership status variable in columns (6) and (7) is completely statistically 
insignificant providing further support for the proposition that homeownership alone does not 
generate ‘good citizens’. First stage F-statistics (reported in columns 5 to 7) for the joint test 
of the instruments are reasonably high for the two variables of interest and all specifications 
comfortably pass the relevant tests. See Table 2 for details. 
 
Non-Neighborhood Specific Measures of Social Capital 
While the empirical evidence so far is consistent with theory and confirms Propositions 1 
and 2, one might be concerned that the effect of individual homeownership on social capital 
is associated with the share of developed land in the Census tract for reasons unrelated to the 
elasticity of new housing supply. Hence, results are presented for two non-neighborhood 
specific measures of social capital, which should not affect local house prices. The prediction 
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is that individual homeownership and its interaction term with the share of developed land 
should not have a positive impact on these forms of social capital (Proposition 3). 
Panel A of Table 3 reports estimates for the total number of social interactions with co-
workers outside work per year. Apart from the dependent variable, again, all seven reported 
specifications are identical to those reported in Panels A and B of Table 2. The sample size of 
13,418 respondents is notably smaller compared to the previous table. This is because no data 
is available for non-working survey respondents. The results provide strong support for 
Proposition 3. The OLS estimates without the interaction effects (columns 1 and 2) suggest 
that individual homeownership is negatively related to social interactions with co-workers. 
The effects are both statistically significant at the 1% level. The independent effects of the 
respondent’s homeownership status variable on the number of interactions with co-workers 
reported in columns (3) to (7) are also negative and in some cases statistically significant. 
Overall these findings are consistent with the view that homeowners – who face time 
constraints – substitute less beneficial activities for more beneficial ones, that is, they may 
prefer to do home improvements or to socially interact with their neighbors rather than to 
meet with co-workers after work. Finally, the interaction effects ‘own × developed’ are 
completely statistically insignificant in all specifications reported in columns (3) to (7). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports estimates for the likelihood that a survey respondent 
participates in a service or fraternal organization. The dependent variable is 1 if a household 
participates and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the individual homeownership status variable 
is always completely insignificant except in columns (1) and (3) where all survey respondent 
specific controls are omitted. The positive effect in these specifications is not very surprising, 
considering that homeownership is strongly positively related to (omitted) income and 
education. When the controls are added, the independent effect of individual homeownership 
becomes completely statistically insignificant, as expected. (The results reported in Appendix 
Table A2 confirm that income and education are strongly positively associated with 
participation in service/fraternal organizations.) Finally, the coefficient on the interaction 
term ‘own×developed’ is completely statistically insignificant in all specifications reported 
in columns (3) to (7). Overall, these results provide additional support for Proposition 3. 
 
Results of Specifications with Endogenous Homeownership 
Table 4 reports results for Specification 2 and all four measures of social capital. The 
reported specifications for each social capital measure are identical to those reported in 
columns (5) to (7) of Tables 2 and 3 except that the respondent’s homeownership status is 
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now also treated as endogenous. The instrumental variable (IV) strategy used to identify the 
endogenous variables is described in Section 3.3. It should be noted that with the exception of 
the estimates for social interactions with immediate neighbors, Wu-Hausman F-tests and 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 2χ -tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the homeownership status 
variable is exogenous, casting doubt on whether the variable should be treated as an 
endogenous variable. To the extent that the variable is in fact exogenous, both OLS and 2SLS 
will be consistent but the 2SLS-estimator will be less efficient. Nevertheless, 2SLS-estimates 
with endogenous homeownership are reported as an additional robustness check.  
Consider first columns (1) to (3) of Panel A, which report estimates for the number of 
social interactions with immediate neighbors. The key variable of interest is the interaction 
effect ‘own×developed’. Note first that the coefficient on the interaction term is essentially 
unaffected by the addition of control variables. In fact, the coefficient slightly increases when 
controls are added. Note also, that the coefficient on the  ‘own×developed’ variable remains 
positive and statistically significant at least at the 5%-level. The implied quantitative effects 
are very large (see Table 5 for details), however, the coefficients are measured less precisely, 
that is, both the standard errors and the size of the coefficients increase quite significantly. 
This finding is similar to that of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) who estimate a specification 
similar to the base specification in this paper. Using an alternative instrumental variable 
strategy to identify the respondent’s homeownership status, they also see their coefficients 
and standard errors increase substantially. 33  (As a further specification test, I applied 
DiPasquale and Glaeser’s instrumental variable strategy instead of the one proposed in this 
paper.34 Results are very similar qualitatively, however, the strategy used in this paper yields 
higher F-statistics and more comfortably passes the various specification tests.35)  
Columns (4) to (6) of Panel A, report linear probability estimates for the respondent’s 
participation in neighborhood associations. Results are qualitatively very similar to those 
reported in columns (1) to (3). Interestingly, both the statistical significance level and the size 
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 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) conclude that their OLS estimates may be more accurate. 
34
 Specifically, I used the average homeownership rate of the income group (based on the income categories 
reported in the SCCBS), race category, and U.S. state cell, to which the survey respondent belongs (excluding 
the respondent and excluding cells with small simple size), as an instrument to identify the homeownership 
status of the respondent. This instrument arguably captures the influence of the local housing market that might 
encourage homeownership. At the same time, controlling for income and race, the group homeownership rates 
should differ across the cells for reasons that should not be a function of social capital contributions. The group 
homeownership rates should also essentially be uncorrelated with other features of social capital investment. 
35
 Two additional alternative identification strategies were tested. Firstly, instead of the maximum subsidy 
rate the average marginal rate was used, assuming the same (national) income distribution for all states. 
Secondly, instead of interacting the maximum subsidy rate with each income category, an instrument was 
created as the interaction of the maximum rate interacted with the average income of each income group. 
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of the coefficient on ‘own × developed’ increases when controls are added. In the 
specifications with all controls, the coefficient on the interaction term is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Again, the implied quantitative effects are very large. A one 
standard deviation increase in the share developed land in a Census tract increases the 
participation probability gap between homeowners and renters by 16.9% points and 17.2% 
points respectively. This is a very meaningful effect given that, on average, only 14% of 
renters and 30% of homeowners participate in neighborhood associations. Overall, Panel A 
of Table 4 provides strong additional support for Propositions 1 and 2 in this paper. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports results for the two non-neighborhood specific measures of 
individual social capital investments, assuming that the homeownership status of respondents 
is endogenously determined. Consistent with Proposition 3, the independent effect of the 
individual homeownership variable is entirely statistically insignificant in all specifications, 
except in column (4), the specification without controls for participation in service/fraternal 
organizations. As discussed above, the positive effect in this specification is not surprising 
given that homeownership is strongly positively related to (omitted) income and education. 
As expected, when the controls are added in column (5), the independent effect of individual 
homeownership becomes completely statistically insignificant. The interaction effect 
‘own×developed’ is completely statistically insignificant in all six specifications. First stage 
F-statistics for the joint test of the instruments are very high for all endogenous regressors 
and all specifications, suggesting that the 2SLS-estimates may not be biased in the same 
direction as the OLS ones (see Table 4 for details).36 All specifications comfortably pass the 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio tests and Hansen-J statistics suggest that the 
instruments are valid. Overall, the results provide strong additional support for Proposition 3.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper I propose that in a setting with high property transaction costs social capital 
investment in a neighborhood is a positive function of the local scarcity of developable land. 
This is because in neighborhoods with little open land (inelastic supply of new housing), the 
social capital induced entry of the marginal newcomer increases house values more strongly, 
discouraging others from entering and thereby preventing further dilution of social capital. 
House price capitalization therefore ensures that immobile homeowners can internalize the 
benefits of their investments. In contrast, in neighborhoods with plenty of open land house 
                                                 
36
 Note that the F-statistic for the ‘share developed’ variable also increases in size, implying that the 
instrumental variables used to identify the homeownership status may also help identifying the share developed 
land (places with more attractive taxes attract more residents, hence, are more developed). 
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prices respond less sensitively to the entry of newcomers and social capital is therefore more 
strongly diluted. Hence, homeowners have fewer incentives to invest in the first place.  
The presented empirical evidence strongly supports this proposition. Consistent with 
theory, in built-up neighborhoods homeowners are significantly more likely to socially 
interact with immediate neighbors than renters. The same is not true in neighborhoods with 
plenty of developable land. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that the effect of land 
scarcity on the link between homeownership and social capital investment is causal. 
Moreover, simulations (based on the specifications reported in columns (6) and (7) of Table 
2A) suggest that the effects are quite important economically: in a neighborhood with little 
open land (85 percent developed), all else equal, homeowners are roughly 25 percent more 
socially interactive than renters. Yet, in a little developed location (15 percent developed) the 
difference is small, in fact, homeowners are somewhat less interactive (1 to 4 fewer 
interactions). Homeowners are also much more likely to participate in neighborhood 
associations if they live in more built up neighborhoods. Again, the interaction effect is 
quantitatively highly meaningful and 2SLS-estimates suggest that the effect is causal. Finally, 
consistent with theory, individual homeownership is not positively related to non-
neighborhood specific social capital and land scarcity does not have a positive effect on the 
link between homeownership and non-neighborhood specific social capital. 
The primary conclusion of this paper is that high homeownership rates alone do not 
ensure formation of social capital. Homeowners have few additional incentives to invest in 
social capital compared to renters in little developed neighborhoods where the long-term net 
benefits of their investments are likely considerably diluted. As a consequence, in these 
neighborhoods, social capital investment may be ‘suboptimal’ from a welfare point of view. 
In contrast, in built-up neighborhoods homeownership provides strong incentives to invest in 
neighborhood specific social capital. Moreover, the initial social capital investments ensure 
that newcomers to a neighborhood (homeowners and renters) are eager to cooperate with the 
existing ‘club members’. In a broader context, the findings imply that house price 
capitalization only provides a compelling mechanism for homeowners to make long-term 
investments into their neighborhoods and local communities if potential new housing supply 
is limited. Hence, differences in housing market conditions may provide an additional 
explanation – besides sorting and peer effects – why suburban locations in highly urbanized 
areas (i.e., locations with high homeownership rates and little developable land) tend to have 
better local public services (e.g., schools) and a greater social capital stock. 
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Summary Statistics and Regression Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Variable List and Means  
 
(N=20,341 unless otherwise noted) 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of social interactions (i.e., talk or visit) 
with immediate neighbors 114.0 112.4 0 312 
Respondent participates in neighborhood 
association (N=20,423) 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Number of times socialized with co-workers 
outside work (only workers) (N=13,418) 13.5 17.6 0 60 
Respondent participates in service or fraternal 
organization (N=20,423) 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Respondent is homeowner 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Expect to stay in community for at least 5 more yrs. 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Respondent is daily commuter 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Daily commuting time in hours (no commute = 0) 0.28 0.41 0 4.92 
Daily commuting time in hours (only commuters) 
(N=13,418) 0.43 0.43 0.02 4.92 
Race is Black  0.11 0.32 0 1 
Race is Asian 0.016 0.13 0 1 
Race is Hispanic 0.068 0.25 0 1 
Respondent is male 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Age of respondent 44.3 16.1 18 99 
Respondent has children  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Number of years lived in local community  
(Omitted category: Less than one year)     
- One to five years 0.26 0.44 0 1 
- Six to ten years 0.15 0.36 0 1 
- Eleven to twenty years 0.17 0.38 0 1 
- More than twenty years 0.27 0.44 0 1 
- All life 0.084 0.28 0 1 
Total household income, 1999  
(Omitted category: Less than $30,000)     
- Between $30,000 and $49,999 0.25 0.43 0 1 
- Between $50,000 and $74, 999 0.20 0.40 0 1 
- Between $75,000 and $99, 999 0.11 0.31 0 1 
- Over $100,000 0.12 0.32 0 1 
- Over $30,000 unspecified 0.040 0.20 0 1 
Marital status  
(Omitted category: Currently Married)     
- Marital status: Never married 0.25 0.43 0 1 
- Marital status: Widowed 0.070 0.26 0 1 
- Marital status: Divorced 0.13 0.34 0 1 
- Marital status: Separated 0.030 0.17 0 1 
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TABLE 1—Continued 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Highest education completed  
(Omitted category: Less than high school) 
    
- Education: High school diploma 0.25 0.43 0 1 
- Education: Some college 0.22 0.41 0 1 
- Education: Assoc. degree (2 y.) or specialized 0.11 0.31 0 1 
- Education: Bachelor’s degree 0.18 0.38 0 1 
- Education: Some graduate training 0.035 0.18 0 1 
- Education: Graduate or professional degree 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Current employment status  
(Omitted category: Working)     
- Current employment: Temporarily laid off 0.016 0.13 0 1 
- Current employment: Unemployed 0.023 0.15 0 1 
- Current employment: Retired 0.14 0.35 0 1 
- Current employment: Permanently disabled 0.033 0.18 0 1 
- Current employment: Homemaker 0.065 0.25 0 1 
- Current employment: Student 0.032 0.18 0 1 
Census tract level variables (from NLCD 1992 and 
Census 2000, matched to 1990 boundaries) 
    
- %-Developed land in Census tract, 1992 0.52 0.36 0.000092 1 
 Only respondents in center city (N=10,749) 0.68 0.30 0.00059 1 
 Only respondents outside MSA (N=2,480) 0.12 0.21 0.00024 0.98 
- Population density in developed area (in person 
per square meter) 0.0032 0.0038 0.0000016 0.20 
- Homeownership rate  0.65 .22 0 1 
- Gini-coefficient of income distribution 0.38 0.051 0.19 0.61 
- Linguistic heterogeneity 0.25 0.16 0 0.73 
- Ethnic heterogeneity 0.25 0.20 0 0.76 
- % Units in single-family detached homes 0.60 0.24 0 1 
- % Units in multi-unit buildings 0.28 0.25 0 1 
Instruments used in 2SLS regressions (excluding 
interaction effects) 
    
- Share wetlands in Census tract 0.016 0.038 0 .6153929 
- County typography: flat plains 0.073 0.26 0 1 
- County typography: smooth plains 0.048 0.21 0 1 
- County typography: irregular plains 0.30 0.46 0 1 
- County typography: tablelands, moderate relief 0.15 0.36 0 1 
- County typography: open low mountains 0.072 0.26 0 1 
- County typography: low mountains 0.060 0.24 0 1 
- County typography: high mountains 0.11 0.31 0 1 
- Total maximum mortgage subsidy rate by state 
(federal plus state)  0.42 0.023 0.40 0.45 
Notes: The summary statistics of the independent variables are reported for the regression sample of Table 2A (number of 
observations = 20,341); unless otherwise noted. This sample only consists of survey respondents with available 
information on all explanatory variables of Table 2 including the % of developed land in the Census tract. The summary 
statistics for the other regression samples are virtually identical to the one reported in Table 1. 
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TABLE 2: Estimates of Neighborhood Specific Measures of Social Capital 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Panel A Dependent Variable: Log of number of social interactions with neighbors plus one, 2000 
 0.65   **  0.26   **  0.39   **  0.069  0.032  -0.16  -0.12 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
  
 0.44   **  0.33   ** 
 0.99   **  0.72   **  0.66   ** Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
  
 (0.091)  (0.082) 
 (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
 0.0055  0.13   **  -0.32   **  -0.12 
 -0.93  **  -0.66   *  -0.56  (*) %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.090)  (0.079) 
 (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.30) 
  -0.048   *   -0.039  (*)   -0.037  (*) 
 -0.29  (*) Log (population density in developed area 
of tract) 
  (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.022) 
 (0.17) 
Controls a)  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.036  0.080  0.037  0.081    
F (first stage): Own × developed      20.4  14.3  13.0 
    Share developed      16.6  9.0  8.7 
    Log (population density)        4.6 
Panel B Dependent Variable: Respondent participates in neighborhood association, 2000 
 0.18 **  0.11 **  0.12   **  0.056   **  0.087   *  0.017  0.024 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.014)     (0.011)     (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.040) 
   0.095   **  0.10   ** 
 0.18   **  0.17   *  0.16  * Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
   (0.028)  (0.028) 
 (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.069) 
 0.077 **  0.056 **  0.0060  -0.022 
 0.061  0.0080  0.025 %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.016)    (0.018)     (0.024)  (0.024) 
 (0.050)  (0.059)  (0.065) 
  0.011   0.013  (*)   0.019   * 
 -0.024 Log (population density in developed area 
of tract) 
  (0.0077)   (0.0077)   (0.0089) 
 (0.063) 
Controls a)  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.061  0.099  0.062  0.101    
F (first stage): Own × developed      20.3  14.3  12.9 
    Share developed      16.7  9.0  8.6 
    Log (population density)        4.6 
Notes: a) Coefficients and statistical significance levels of all variables are reported in Appendix Table A2 for the base specification with all controls (column 2). Bold coefficients are 
instrumented. The list of instruments includes the share wetland in the Census tract; the share wetland interacted with the respondent’s homeownership status; county dummy 
variables for the following topography types: flat plains, smooth plains, irregular plains, tablelands and moderate relief, open low mountains, low mountains and high mountains; 
these topography dummies interacted with the respondent’s homeownership status. Standard errors are clustered by Census county (adjusted for intra-county correlation). ** / * / (*) 
Significantly different from zero with 99% / 95% / 90% confidence. The specifications reported in columns (5) to (7) comfortably pass the Anderson canonical correlations 
likelihood-ratio test suggesting that the models are identified. Hansen J statistics suggest that the instruments are valid. Number of obs.: 20,341 (Panel A) and 20,423 (Panel B). 
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TABLE 3: Estimates of Non-Neighborhood Specific Measures of Social Capital 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Panel A Dependent variable: Log of number of times socialized with co-workers outside work plus one, 2000 
 -0.18  **  -0.13  **  -0.15   **  -0.098  (*)  -0.23  (*)  -0.15  -0.19 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.025)    (0.028)    (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
   -0.048  -0.060 
 0.082  0.022  0.085 Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
   (0.063)  (0.060) 
 (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.19) 
 -0.040  -0.021  -0.0045  0.025 
 -0.11  -0.072  -0.16 %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.062)  (0.071) 
 (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
  0.032   0.031   0.031 
 0.23 Log (population density in developed area 
of tract) 
  (0.023)   (0.023)   (0.023) 
 (0.20) 
Controls a)  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.016  0.11  0.016  0.11    
F (first stage): Own × developed      17.2  13.1  13.2 
    Share developed      14.5  9.3  9.2 
    Log (population density)        4.7 
Panel B Dependent variable: Respondent participates in service or fraternal organization, 2000 
 0.036  **  0.0011  0.035   **  0.011  0.011  -0.012  -0.010 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.0049)    (0.0066)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
   0.0025  -0.016 
 0.049  0.022  0.019 Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
   (0.015)  (0.015) 
 (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
 0.0026  -0.015  0.00072  -0.0028 
 -0.0031  -0.034  -0.029 %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
 (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.050) 
  -0.021  **   -0.021   **   -0.020   ** 
 -0.034 Log (population density in developed area 
of tract) 
  (0.0048)     (0.0047)   (0.0049) 
 (0.049) 
Controls a)  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.0088  0.051  0.088  0.051    
F (first stage): Own × developed      20.3  14.3  12.9 
    Share developed      16.6  9.0  8.6 
    Log (population density)        4.6 
Notes: a) Coefficients and statistical significance levels of all variables (including constant) are reported in Appendix Table A2 for the base specification with all controls (column 2). 
Bold coefficients are instrumented. For the list of instrumental variables see Table 2. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by Census 
county (i.e., adjusted for intra-county correlation). ** / * / (*) Significantly different from zero with 99% / 95% / 90% confidence. The specifications reported in columns (5) to (7) 
comfortably pass the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test suggesting that the models are identified. Hansen J statistics suggest that the instruments are valid. 
Number of observations: 13,418 (Panel A) and 20,423 (Panel B). 
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TABLE 4: 2SLS-Estimates of Social Capital with Endogenous Homeownership Status Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A Dependent variable: Interactions with neighbors Dependent variable: Participation in neighborhood associations 
 0.22  -1.1   *  -1.3   *  0.26   *  -0.074  -0.085 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.37)  (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
 1.2   *  1.3   *  1.5   **  0.34  (*)  0.47   **  0.48   ** Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
 (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
 -1.0  *  -1.1   *  -1.11   *  -0.0040  -0.20  (*)  -0.20 (*) %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
   -0.011 
 -0.31  (*)   0.026   **  0.010 Log (population density in developed area of 
tract) 
   (0.026) 
 (0.16)   (0.010)  (0.051) 
Controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F (first stage): Own  147.1  27.6  27.1  153.3  26.9  26.1 
    Own × developed  138.5  34.6  31.2  136.9  35.2  31.7 
    Share developed  107.7  34.7  35.7  106.9  34.4  35.6 
    Log (population density)    7.8    8.3 
Panel B Dependent variable: Interactions with co-workers outside work Dependent variable: Participation in service/fraternal org. 
 0.42  -0.054  -0.070  0.29  **  0.12  0.15 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.27)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.082)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
 0.58  0.30  0.30  -0.097  -0.0011  -0.020 Interaction: Homeowner ×   
%-developed land, 1992 
 (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
 -0.23  -0.20  -0.19  0.11  -0.039  -0.033 %-Developed land in  
Census tract, 1992 
 (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.097)  (0.095)  (0.095) 
  0.040 
 0.000090   -0.023   **  0.021 Log (population density in developed area of 
tract) 
  (0.025) 
 (0.16)   (0.0055)  (0.039) 
Controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F (first stage): Own  329.4  19.8  19.4  153.0  26.8  26.1 
    Own × developed  168.1  58.3  58.4  137.5  35.1  31.6 
    Share developed  248.7  37.2  42.9  106.9  34.4  35.6 
    Log (population density)    12.3    8.2 
Notes: Bold coefficients are instrumented. In addition to the instruments reported in the notes of Table 2 to identify the share developed land and population density, the total maximum 
mortgage subsidy rate by state interacted with each income category-dummy is used as an instrument to identify the homeownership status of the survey respondent. The interactions of 
the instruments are used to identify the interaction of the two endogenous explanatory variables (share developed and homeownership status). Numbers in parenthesis are robust 
standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by Census county. ** / * / (*) Significantly different from zero with 99% / 95% / 90% confidence. All specifications comfortably pass the 
Anderson canonical correlations LR-test and the Hansen-Sargan test (J-statistic). Numbers of observations are identical to those reported in the notes of Tables 2 and 3. Wu-Hausman 
F-tests and Durbin-Wu-Hausman-chi-sq tests of the specifications reported in columns (A5), (A6), (B2), (B3), (B5) and (B6) clearly cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
homeownership status variable is exogenous. The hypothesis can be rejected with 93% and 97%  confidence for the specifications reported in columns (A2) and (A3). 
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TABLE 5 
Quantitative Effects 
 
 Specification Renter Owner ∆ Own  
versus Rent 
Change in # of Social Interactions 
with Immediate Neighbors    
Additional # of 
Interactions 
Table 2A (2)  Baseline  12.1  12.1 Effect of homeownership status on 
number of social interactions 
 
Table 2A (4)  Baseline  11.3 
 a) 
 3.3 b) 
 11.3 a) 
 3.3 b) 
Table 2A (4)  -1.8  4.1  +5.9 
Table 2A (6)  -11.8  1.5  +13.3 
Table 2A (7)  -10.3  2.5  +12.8 
Table 4A (2)  -28.3  5.7  +34.1 
Interaction effect: %-Developed land 
increases by 1 std. dev. (+36.1%) 
 
Table 4A (3)  -34.2  7.9  +42.1 
Change in Prob. that Respondent 
Participates in Neigh. Association    
Add. Change in 
Probability 
Table 2B (2)  Baseline  11.5% points  11.5% points Effect of homeownership status on 
probability of participation in 
neighborhood associations 
 
Table 2B (4)  Baseline  10.8% points
 a) 
 5.6% points b) 
 10.8% points a) 
 5.6% points  b) 
Table 2B (4)  -0.8% points  2.9% points  +3.6% points 
Table 2B (6)  0.3% points  6.4% points  +6.1% points 
Table 2B (7)  0.9% points  6.6% points  +5.7% points 
Table 4A (5)  -7.3% points  9.6% points +16.9% points 
%-Developed land increases  
by 1 std. dev. (+36.1%) 
 
 
Table 4A (6)  -7.4% points  9.8% points +17.2% points 
Notes: All effects are measured at the sample mean of each variable. The probability of participation in neighborhood 
associations at the sample mean is 25.3%. The average participation probability of renters is much lower than that of 
homeowners: 14.1% versus 30.0%. The number of social interactions with immediate neighbors at the sample mean is 
114.0. Homeowners have on average 119.2 social interactions; while renters have on average about 101.9 social 
interactions. Quantitative effects are computed using all coefficients independent of statistical significance levels. The 
average %-developed land in a Census tract is 51.7% (sample mean; based on the regression sample for Table 2A). One 
standard deviation equals 36.1%. The average %-developed land in a Census tract belonging to a center city of an MSA is 
67.8% (weighted by the number of respondents in each tract). The average %-developed area in a non-MSA location is 
12.0% (weighted by the number of respondents in each tract). a) Effects are total effects including both independent 
effects and interaction effects. b) Effects are based on independent effects of homeownership only. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Relationship between Land Availability and New Housing Supply Elasticity 
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Explanation: Figure A1 depicts a typical long-run housing supply curve S for a neighborhood 
reflecting the marginal opportunity cost of conversion of landowners. The total land area of the 
neighborhood is L . Consider first a situation where a neighborhood is little developed (or ‘rural’, R) 
with most of the land 
,1RL H−  still being developable. The supply curve is kinked at point A, being 
(almost) perfectly inelastic at point A (since the existing housing stock cannot be easily demolished) 
and then becoming quite elastic. In stage 1, demand for housing is rather weak ( 1,RD ), leaving plenty 
of open land for future development. The social capital induced net benefits attract newcomers to the 
neighborhood thereby diminishing the net benefits but having little effect on property prices since the 
supply curve is quite elastic (landowners are quite willing to convert open land into housing). As is 
illustrated by the small increase in property prices *RP∆ , the effect of the investment on house prices is 
very limited, providing little house price induced incentives to invest in social capital in the first place. 
Next consider the situation where the neighborhood is more or less built up (or ‘urban’, U) with only a 
small amount of the land in the neighborhood 
,1UL H−  still being developable. Again the supply 
curve is kinked at point C. Similar to the rural case, the club good induced net benefits attract 
newcomers to the neighborhood, however, the high reservation prices of the remaining landowners 
limit the number of newcomers implying a much smaller dilution effect and a much larger effect of 
the social capital investment on house prices *UP∆ . 
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TABLE A1 
SCCBS Communities included in Regression Sample 
 
Community Total Sample Size In % 
Regression 
Sample Size In % 
Atlanta Metro 510 1.94 381 1.87 
Baton Rouge 500 1.91 382 1.88 
Birmingham Metro 500 1.91 373 1.83 
Bismarck (ND) 506 1.93 401 1.97 
Boston (City) 604 2.3 422 2.07 
Boulder (CO) 500 1.91 387 1.9 
Central Oregon 500 1.91 398 1.96 
Charlotte Region/14 County 1,500 5.72 1,189 5.85 
Chicago Metro 750 2.86 545 2.68 
Cincinnati Metro 1,001 3.82 812 3.99 
Cleveland/Cuyahoga County 1,100 4.19 849 4.17 
Delaware 1,383 5.27 1,091 5.36 
Denver (City/County) 501 1.91 408 2.01 
Detroit Metro/7-County 501 1.91 399 1.96 
East Tennessee 500 1.91 388 1.91 
Fremont/Newaygo County (MI) 753 2.87 633 3.11 
Grand Rapids (City) 502 1.91 430 2.11 
Greensboro/Guilford County 752 2.87 626 3.08 
Houston/Harris County 500 1.91 362 1.78 
Indiana 1,001 3.82 781 3.84 
Kalamazoo County 500 1.91 413 2.03 
Kanawha Valley (WV) 500 1.91 389 1.91 
Lewiston-Auburn (ME) 523 1.99 416 2.05 
Los Angeles County 515 1.96 388 1.91 
Minneapolis 501 1.91 403 1.98 
Montana 502 1.91 405 1.99 
New Hampshire 711 2.71 553 2.72 
North Minneapolis 452 1.72 350 1.72 
Peninsula-Silicon Valley 1,505 5.74 1,179 5.8 
Phoenix/Maricopa County 501 1.91 363 1.78 
Rochester Metro (NY) 988 3.77 785 3.86 
Rural South East Dakota 368 1.4 0 0 
San Diego County 504 1.92 409 2.01 
San Francisco (City) 500 1.91 413 2.03 
Seattle 502 1.91 385 1.89 
St. Paul Metro 503 1.92 397 1.95 
Syracuse/Onondaga County 541 2.06 423 2.08 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County 750 2.86 620 3.05 
Yakima (WA) 500 1.91 394 1.94 
York (PA) 500 1.91 399 1.96 
Total 26,230 100 20,341 100 
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TALBE A2 
OLS Estimates for Base Specifications with All Controls 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Table 2A (2) 
Interaction w. 
Neighbors 
 Table 2B (2) 
Participation 
Nghd Assoc. 
Table 3A (2) 
Interaction w.  
Co-Workers 
Table 3B (2) 
Participation 
Service/Frat. 
 0.26  **  0.11  **  -0.13  **  0.0011 Respondent is homeowner 
 (0.040)  (0.011)  (0.028)  (0.0066) 
 0.13  **  0.056  **  -0.021  -0.015 %-Developed land in Census tract, 1992 
 (0.044)  (0.018)  (0.043)  (0.012) 
 0.018  0.20  **  0.052  -0.016 Homeownership rate in Census tract 
 (0.19)  (0.062)  (0.15)  (0.039) 
 -0.048  *  0.011  0.032  -0.021  ** Population density in developed area  
of Census tract  (0.021) (0.0077)  (0.023)  (0.0048) 
 0.23  **  0.032  **  0.044  (*)  0.00015 Expect to stay in community for at least 
5 more years  (0.037) (0.0057)  (0.026)  (0.0067) 
Other Census tract level controls:     
 0.38  0.018  0.25  0.025 - Gini coefficient of income 
distribution in Census tract  (0.33)  (0.11)  (0.29)  (0.066) 
 -0.038  -0.023  -0.226  (*)  0.0092 - Linguistic heterogeneity in Census 
tract  (0.18)  (0.060)  (0.13)  (0.041) 
 -0.21  0.089  *  0.0092  -0.0087 
- Ethnic heterogeneity in Census tract 
 (0.13)  (0.042)  (0.083)  (0.026) 
 -0.011  0.0011  -0.17  (*) -0.00055 - Share of housing units that are single-
family detached homes in tract  (0.11)  (0.043)  (0.10)  (0.024) 
 0.058  0.22  **  -0.091  -0.0081 - Share of housing units that are in 
multi-unit buildings in tract  (0.20)  (0.065)  (0.15)  (0.036) 
Other survey respondent specific controls:     
 -0.016  -0.018   -0.0031 
- Respondent is commuting 
 (0.052)  (0.014)   (0.012) 
 -0.12  **  0.0030  -0.080  **  0.0037 - Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0)  (0.040) (0.0078)  (0.026)  (0.0056) 
- Race is White reference reference reference reference 
 -0.37  **  0.075  **  -0.29  **  0.038  ** 
- Race is Black  
 (0.048)  (0.015)  (0.040)  (0.0089) 
 -0.39  **  -0.024  -0.31  **  -0.014 
- Race is Asian  
 (0.12)  (0.020)  (0.074)  (0.019) 
 -0.59  **  -0.015  -0.24  **  0.015 
- Race is Hispanic 
 (0.080)  (0.014)  (0.055)  (0.010) 
 0.075  **  -0.0022  0.13  **  -0.011  * 
- Respondent is male 
 (0.027) (0.0060)  (0.023)  (0.0052) 
 0.0035  0.0082  **  -0.036  **  -0.0057  ** 
- Age of respondent (0.0057) (0.0016) (0.0058)  (0.0010) 
 0.029  -0.057  **  0.16 *  0.068  ** 
- Age of respondent squared (in ‘000) 
 (0.058)  (0.017)  (0.069)  (0.011) 
 0.22  **  0.022  **  -0.13  **  -0.026  ** 
- Respondent has children 
 (0.032) (0.0066)  (0.022)  (0.0057) 
- Number of years lived in local 
community: less than one year reference reference reference reference 
 0.41  **  0.041  **  0.015  -0.0017 - Number of years lived in local 
community: 1-5 years  (0.062)  (0.010)  (0.042)  (0.010) 
 0.52  **  0.059  **  0.11  *  0.0093 - Number of years lived in local 
community: 6-10 years  (0.068)  (0.012)  (0.045)  (0.010) 
 0.51  **  0.034  **  0.089  *  0.018 - Number of years lived in local 
community: 11-20 years  (0.068)  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.011) 
 0.47  **  0.019  0.10  **  0.037  ** - Number of years lived in local 
community: More than 20 years  (0.067)  (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.011) 
 0.48  **  0.0024  0.11  *  0.030  ** - Number of years lived in local 
community: All life 
 (0.066)  (0.013)  (0.049)  (0.011) 
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TABLE A2—Continued 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Table 2A (2) 
Interaction w. 
Neighbors 
 Table 2B (2) 
Participation 
Nghd Assoc. 
Table 3A (2) 
Interaction w.  
Co-Workers 
Table 3B (2) 
Participation 
Service/Frat. 
- Total household income: <$30,000 reference reference reference reference 
 0.085  **  0.026  **  0.23  **  0.025  ** - Total household income:  
$30,000-49,999  (0.031) (0.0090)  (0.036)  (0.0072) 
 0.090  *  0.030  **  0.34  **  0.043  ** - Total household income:  
$50,000-74,999  (0.041) (0.0096)  (0.042)  (0.0080) 
 0.14  **  0.071  **  0.44  **  0.061  ** - Total household income:  
$75,000-99,999  (0.038)  (0.012)  (0.044)  (0.0094) 
 0.14  **  0.12  **  0.54  **  0.082  ** - Total household income:  
Over 100,000  (0.048)  (0.014)  (0.054)  (0.012) 
 0.10  (*)  0.065  **  0.35  **  0.058  ** - Total household income:  
Over $30,000 unspecified  (0.055)  (0.017)  (0.060)  (0.016) 
- Marital status: Currently married reference reference reference reference 
 -0.17  **  -0.0034  0.20  **  0.0014 
- Marital status: Never married 
 (0.037) (0.0087)  (0.030)  (0.0066) 
 0.12  *  -0.016  0.32  **  0.0059 
- Marital status: Widowed 
 (0.057)  (0.016)  (0.082)  (0.013) 
 -0.056  0.011  0.33  **  0.016  * 
- Marital status: Divorced 
 (0.035) (0.0083)  (0.033)  (0.0066) 
 -0.33  **  -0.0056  0.16  *  0.036  * 
- Marital status: Separated 
 (0.070)  (0.016)  (0.066)  (0.014) 
- Education: Less than high school reference reference reference reference 
 0.22  **  0.024 *  0.25  **  0.020  * - Highest education completed: High 
school diploma  (0.067)  (0.010)  (0.070)  (0.0083) 
 0.29  **  0.070 **  0.39  **  0.065  ** - Highest education completed: Some 
college  (0.068)  (0.012)  (0.070)  (0.010) 
 0.32  **  0.087  **  0.38  **  0.070  ** - Highest education completed: 
Associate degree (2 y.) or specialized  (0.077)  (0.016)  (0.075)  (0.012) 
 0.31  **  0.12  **  0.44  **  0.13  ** - Highest education completed: 
Bachelor’s degree  (0.069)  (0.016)  (0.072)  (0.012) 
 0.32  **  0.096  **  0.45  **  0.16  ** - Highest education completed: Some 
graduate training  (0.11)  (0.021)  (0.084)  (0.017) 
 0.25  **  0.13  **  0.48  **  0.15  ** - Highest education completed: 
Graduate or professional degree  (0.074)  (0.014)  (0.070)  (0.015) 
- Current employment status: Working reference reference  reference 
 -0.18  (*)  0.0066   -0.040  * - Current employment status: 
Temporarily laid off  (0.098)  (0.026)   (0.019) 
 -0.088  -0.055  **   -0.014 - Current employment status: 
Unemployed  (0.10)  (0.018)   (0.017) 
 0.18  **  0.016   0.0080 
- Current employment status: Retired 
 (0.068)  (0.020)   (0.017) 
 0.10  -0.0011   0.0078 - Current employment status: 
Permanently disabled  (0.075)  (0.021)   (0.019) 
 0.086  -0.0013  -0.76  **  -0.012 
- Current employment status: 
Homemaker  (0.067)  (0.017)  (0.14)  (0.014) 
 -0.17  *  0.0053  0.021  0.096  ** 
- Current employment status: Student 
 (0.079)  (0.017)  (0.087)  (0.019) 
Community sample fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  2.1  **  -0.42  **  2.7  **  0.0045 
  (0.33)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.064) 
Number of observations  20341  20423  13418  20423 
Adjusted R2  0.080  0.099  0.11  .051 
Notes: All variables are from 2000 unless otherwise stated. ** Significantly different from zero with 99% confidence. * 
Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. (*) Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. 
 
